@article{63a46e2a39e14d1f88b0879f5a942dd6,
title = "Vertical competition in unitary states: The case of Italy",
abstract = "In unitary states - states in which constitutional powers are owned by the central government vertical competition can generate stable outcomes, that is outcomes that do not unravel through arbitrary repossessions by the center. Stability is a product of institutional commitment devices. Through these a democratic government, though it cannot bind successor governments, can effectively oblige them to respect some of the decisions it has made. A number of such commitment devices exist in Italy; they make possible stable vertical competition between central and regional governments.",
author = "Albert Breton and Angela Fraschini",
note = "Funding Information: ∗ We would like to thank Richard Bird, Giorgio Brosio, Giovanni Cordini, Silvana Dal-mazzone, Francesco Forte, Gianluigi Galeotti, and Pierre Salmon for comments on earlier drafts of the paper and for their answers to innumerable factual and theoretical questions. We also wish to thank participants in a seminar at State University of New York, Binghamton, and an anonymous referee for their perceptive comments. The usual disclaimer applies. We would also like to thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its financial assistance. A first draft of the paper was written while Breton was a Fellow at the International Centre for Economic Research in Turin. He would like to thank the Centre for its hospitality.",
year = "2003",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1023/A:1020804609334",
language = "English",
volume = "114",
pages = "57--77",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1-2",
}