TY - JOUR
T1 - Thresholds
T2 - A model of religious governance and evolution
AU - Ferrero, Mario
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2017/12
Y1 - 2017/12
N2 - Religious organizations set thresholds of belief and behavior required of their members. In a simple model of individual religious behavior, this paper shows that if a religion denies the benefits of membership to those who fall short of the threshold, it stands to gain an increase in compliance with its rules by forcing members to the edge of defection, hence the incentive to set the thresholds strategically. When members’ compliance costs are private information, the model yields several regimes: a pooling contract if costs are close enough to each other, a separating contract if costs are different enough, and an expulsion solution if the proportion of high-cost types in the total membership is too low. Changes in costs and in membership composition trigger changes in thresholds and switches between regimes, thus providing a model of religious governance and evolution. We then review the history of sectarianism in the three monotheistic religions and show that the model can help account for the basic differences between them as well as explain the historical evolution of dogmas and behavioral rules within each of them. A specialized case study focuses on the evolution of Catholic religious orders.
AB - Religious organizations set thresholds of belief and behavior required of their members. In a simple model of individual religious behavior, this paper shows that if a religion denies the benefits of membership to those who fall short of the threshold, it stands to gain an increase in compliance with its rules by forcing members to the edge of defection, hence the incentive to set the thresholds strategically. When members’ compliance costs are private information, the model yields several regimes: a pooling contract if costs are close enough to each other, a separating contract if costs are different enough, and an expulsion solution if the proportion of high-cost types in the total membership is too low. Changes in costs and in membership composition trigger changes in thresholds and switches between regimes, thus providing a model of religious governance and evolution. We then review the history of sectarianism in the three monotheistic religions and show that the model can help account for the basic differences between them as well as explain the historical evolution of dogmas and behavioral rules within each of them. A specialized case study focuses on the evolution of Catholic religious orders.
KW - Economics of religion
KW - Monotheistic religions
KW - Religious competition
KW - Religious orders
KW - Sectarianism
KW - Thresholds
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029316034&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.08.003
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.08.003
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-2680
VL - 50
SP - 1
EP - 21
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
ER -