Abstract
Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes [1998, Erkenntnis49, 1–20] and Kuipers [2000, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Kluwer, Dordrecht] are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist
Lingua originale | Inglese |
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pagine (da-a) | 115-138 |
Numero di pagine | 24 |
Rivista | Erkenntnis |
Volume | 64 |
Numero di pubblicazione | 1 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2006 |
Keywords
- Bayesianism
- Confirmation paradoxes
- Hypothetico-Deductivism