The tacking by disjunction paradox: Bayesianism versus Hypothetico-deductivism

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Abstract

Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes [1998, Erkenntnis49, 1–20] and Kuipers [2000, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Kluwer, Dordrecht] are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist
Lingua originaleInglese
pagine (da-a)115-138
Numero di pagine24
RivistaErkenntnis
Volume64
Numero di pubblicazione1
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2006

Keywords

  • Bayesianism
  • Confirmation paradoxes
  • Hypothetico-Deductivism

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