Abstract
According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
Lingua originale | Inglese |
---|---|
pagine (da-a) | 382-389 |
Numero di pagine | 8 |
Rivista | Analysis |
Volume | 74 |
Numero di pubblicazione | 3 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2014 |
Keywords
- Moore's proof
- immediate justification
- perceptual dogmatism