TY - JOUR
T1 - Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism
AU - McCain, K
AU - MORETTI, LUCA
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if a subject S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its anti-sceptical bite. This article provides a novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021).
AB - According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if a subject S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its anti-sceptical bite. This article provides a novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021).
KW - phenomenal conservatism
KW - phenomenal explanationism
KW - reflective awareness
KW - phenomenal conservatism
KW - phenomenal explanationism
KW - reflective awareness
UR - https://iris.uniupo.it/handle/11579/185358
U2 - 10.1007/s10670-024-00791-x
DO - 10.1007/s10670-024-00791-x
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-0106
JO - Erkenntnis
JF - Erkenntnis
ER -