Redistribution and crime when agents have limited liability: A note

Alberto Cassone; Carla Marchese

doi:10.2202/1555-5879.1035

Redistribution and crime when agents have limited liability: A note

Alberto Cassone, Carla Marchese

Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza e Scienze Politiche, Economiche e Sociali

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo su rivista › Articolo in rivista › peer review

Abstract

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

Lingua originale	Inglese
Numero di articolo	2
Rivista	Review of Law and Economics
Volume	2
Numero di pubblicazione	2
DOI	https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1035
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 8 set 2006

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Redistribution and crime when agents have limited liability: A note

Abstract

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