Abstract
Three main stages of Hobbes' reflection on the relationship between reason and the passions are examined here. 1) The first is presented in the Preface to the second edition of De cive where Hobbes pleads a strong naturalization of the passions. 2) A step further is taken when Hobbes reflects on the problem of deliberation, that is, on the use of practical reason. During his polemical discourse with Bramhall, he takes sides against the Aristotelian theory of orexis dianoetike. 3) Finally, Leviathan finds in the passion of curiosity the engine that puts in motion the human mind. This new solution implies going beyond the dualism between reason and the passions, the point at which the preface of the second edition of De cive had halted, but at the same time, this solution implies a new definition of human specificity. This is a specificity in which reason and the passions are no longer separate, as in the classical model, but become reciprocally involved to form a unity. Significantly, the "constant" and "regulated train of thoughts", in which reason exists is called by Hobbes "Passionate Thought".
Lingua originale | Inglese |
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Titolo della pubblicazione ospite | Emotional Minds |
Sottotitolo della pubblicazione ospite | The Passions and the Limits of Pure Inquiry in Early Modern Philosophy |
Editore | Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co. KG |
Pagine | 227-256 |
Numero di pagine | 30 |
ISBN (stampa) | 9783110260908 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 30 lug 2012 |
Pubblicato esternamente | Sì |