Oltre i controlli fiscali: un’analisi del comportamento dei contribuenti riconosciuti evasori

The level of tax evasion in Italy is higher than the OECD average. In addition, only a small fraction of the total amount of unpaid taxes noticed to taxpayers is actually cashed by collection agencies. Within this framework, the present study investigates how prior tax notices – following audit and detection of tax fraud by Fiscal Authorities – affect individual compliance decisions. Differently from the existing literature on tax evasion, the focus here is on taxpayers who have been already caught by Fiscal Authorities as noncompliant. These individuals can decide to “runaway”, by changing home address, in order to escape collection agents, thus avoiding to pay their due amount. Empirical results on actual data show that previous notices reduce the probability that cheaters decide to move. However, the implied costs are not large enough to correct in many instances the individual incentives to hide out. From an enforcement policy perspective, both monetary and psychological costs associated with the tax notice should be strengthened in order to increase the amount of evaded taxes cashed by Fiscal Authorities.