Abstract
The aim of this edited collection is to explore non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—roughly, the view that evidence is not required in order for a doxastic attitude to have a positive epistemic standing. According to this view, it is possible for belief or acceptance to be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational in the absence of supporting evidence. This initial chapter introduces the topic and the contents of the single contributions.
Lingua originale | Inglese |
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Titolo della pubblicazione ospite | Non-Evidentialist Epistemology |
Editore | Brill |
Pagine | 1-24 |
Numero di pagine | 24 |
ISBN (stampa) | 9789004398955 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2021 |
Keywords
- epistemic entitlement
- epistemic justification
- evidentialism
- hinge epistemology
- scepticism