Abstract
This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.
Lingua originale | Inglese |
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Editore | Brill |
ISBN (stampa) | 978-90-04-39895-5 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2021 |
Keywords
- Epistemic justification
- Evidentialism
- non-evidential justification