Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism about Metaphysical Modality

N Ciprotti, LUCA MORETTI

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo su rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

Abstract

Beall and Restall 2000; 2001; 2006 advocate a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism, according to which there is not one true logic but many equally acceptable logical systems. They maintain that Logical Pluralism is compatible with monism about metaphysical modality, according to which there is just one correct logic of metaphysical modality. Wyatt 2004 contends that Logical Pluralism is incompatible with monism about metaphysical modality. We first suggest that if Wyatt were right, Logical Pluralism would be strongly implausible because it would get upside down a dependence relation that holds between metaphysics and logic of modality. We then argue that Logical Pluralism is prima facie compatible with monism about metaphysical modality
Lingua originaleInglese
pagine (da-a)275-284
Numero di pagine10
RivistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume87
Numero di pubblicazione2
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2009

Keywords

  • logical pluralism
  • metaphysical necessity
  • modal logic

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