Fragmentalism: Putting All the Pieces Together

According to perspectival realism, reality is (at least partially) constituted by ‘purely perspectival’ facts, that is, facts that appear to describe reality only from a given ‘perspective’. Fragmentalism is a form of perspectival realism that maintains both that no perspective is privileged and that perspectival facts constitute reality absolutely. Assuming that reality is sufficiently variegated, fragmentalism entails that reality is absolutely constituted by incompatible facts. Given that incompatible facts can never obtain together, reality must be divided into a plurality of ‘fragments’ that never compose a coherent, unitary whole. The main aim of this paper is to provide the first rigorous, detailed map of fragmentalism and its rivals. First, we will argue that fragmentalism is best construed as having two ‘unitist’ (that is, non-fragmentalist) boundaries, which we will call ‘coherent’ and ‘incoherent unitism’. Second, we will present what we take to be the six main viable versions of fragmentalism and show how they can be categorized according to whether they take the logical operations of conjunction and negation to be either ‘local’ or ‘global’.