Dynamic collusion and collusion games in Knaster's procedure

Federica Briata; Marco Dall'Aglio; Vito Fragnelli

Dynamic collusion and collusion games in Knaster's procedure

Federica Briata
, Marco Dall'Aglio
, Vito Fragnelli

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo su rivista › Articolo in rivista › peer review

Abstract

In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

Lingua originale	Inglese
pagine (da-a)	199-208
Numero di pagine	10
Rivista	AUCO Czech Economic Review
Volume	6
Numero di pubblicazione	3
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - nov 2012
Pubblicato esternamente	Sì

Altri file e collegamenti

Link to publication in Scopus

Cita questo

@article{b209ab3fa2264b119425e6e8fcc948c9,

title = "Dynamic collusion and collusion games in Knaster's procedure",

abstract = "In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.",

keywords = "Complete risk aversion, Dynamic coalition formation, Fairness, Knaster's procedure",

author = "Federica Briata and Marco Dall'Aglio and Vito Fragnelli",

year = "2012",

month = nov,

language = "English",

volume = "6",

pages = "199--208",

journal = "AUCO Czech Economic Review",

issn = "1802-4696",

publisher = "Faculty of Economics, Charles University in Prague",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dynamic collusion and collusion games in Knaster's procedure

AU - Briata, Federica

AU - Dall'Aglio, Marco

AU - Fragnelli, Vito

PY - 2012/11

Y1 - 2012/11

N2 - In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

AB - In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

KW - Complete risk aversion

KW - Dynamic coalition formation

KW - Fairness

KW - Knaster's procedure

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84868518171

M3 - Article

SN - 1802-4696

VL - 6

SP - 199

EP - 208

JO - AUCO Czech Economic Review

JF - AUCO Czech Economic Review

IS - 3

ER -

Dynamic collusion and collusion games in Knaster's procedure

Abstract

Altri file e collegamenti

Fingerprint

Cita questo