Competition among volunteers

Franco Cugno; Mario Ferrero

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009

Competition among volunteers

Franco Cugno
, Mario Ferrero

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo su rivista › Articolo in rivista › peer review

Abstract

Volunteer labor is analyzed as a selfish, rational investment activity that people undertake to compete for rents, or prizes, auctioned off by a nonmarket, output-maximizing organization. The model is located at the intersection of the tournament and rent-seeking literatures and proves that, with identical risk-neutral individuals, only two prizes, and free entry, the organization will find it optimal to set the bottom prize at zero and thus promote a volunteer contest. A broad range of real-world examples is shown to fit well with the model.

Lingua originale	Inglese
pagine (da-a)	637-654
Numero di pagine	18
Rivista	European Journal of Political Economy
Volume	20
Numero di pubblicazione	3
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - set 2004
Pubblicato esternamente	Sì

Accesso al documento

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009

Altri file e collegamenti

Link to publication in Scopus

Cita questo

@article{d62400c3431b4190ad4370cb8f8356c8,

title = "Competition among volunteers",

abstract = "Volunteer labor is analyzed as a selfish, rational investment activity that people undertake to compete for rents, or prizes, auctioned off by a nonmarket, output-maximizing organization. The model is located at the intersection of the tournament and rent-seeking literatures and proves that, with identical risk-neutral individuals, only two prizes, and free entry, the organization will find it optimal to set the bottom prize at zero and thus promote a volunteer contest. A broad range of real-world examples is shown to fit well with the model.",

keywords = "Contests, Nonmarket organizations, Rent seeking, Volunteer labor",

author = "Franco Cugno and Mario Ferrero",

year = "2004",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009",

language = "English",

volume = "20",

pages = "637--654",

journal = "European Journal of Political Economy",

issn = "0176-2680",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition among volunteers

AU - Cugno, Franco

AU - Ferrero, Mario

PY - 2004/9

Y1 - 2004/9

N2 - Volunteer labor is analyzed as a selfish, rational investment activity that people undertake to compete for rents, or prizes, auctioned off by a nonmarket, output-maximizing organization. The model is located at the intersection of the tournament and rent-seeking literatures and proves that, with identical risk-neutral individuals, only two prizes, and free entry, the organization will find it optimal to set the bottom prize at zero and thus promote a volunteer contest. A broad range of real-world examples is shown to fit well with the model.

AB - Volunteer labor is analyzed as a selfish, rational investment activity that people undertake to compete for rents, or prizes, auctioned off by a nonmarket, output-maximizing organization. The model is located at the intersection of the tournament and rent-seeking literatures and proves that, with identical risk-neutral individuals, only two prizes, and free entry, the organization will find it optimal to set the bottom prize at zero and thus promote a volunteer contest. A broad range of real-world examples is shown to fit well with the model.

KW - Contests

KW - Nonmarket organizations

KW - Rent seeking

KW - Volunteer labor

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/4344605040

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.009

M3 - Article

SN - 0176-2680

VL - 20

SP - 637

EP - 654

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

IS - 3

ER -

Competition among volunteers

Abstract

Accesso al documento

Altri file e collegamenti

Fingerprint

Cita questo