TY - JOUR
T1 - Coalition formation in games without side payments
AU - Centrone, F.
AU - Meo, C.
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank Fabio Maccheroni, an anonymous referee and an Associate Editor for helpful comments and suggestions. The support by Research Grant n. 2006132713-005 (Ministero dell’ Università e della Ricerca) is also gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 2008/11
Y1 - 2008/11
N2 - We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295-1313] into the classical Shapley λ-transfer value. Our analysis starts by first defining a new solution concept, the λ-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.
AB - We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295-1313] into the classical Shapley λ-transfer value. Our analysis starts by first defining a new solution concept, the λ-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.
KW - Coalition structures
KW - Cooperative games
KW - Stability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=54049126478&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.007
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.007
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-4896
VL - 56
SP - 314
EP - 320
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
IS - 3
ER -