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Vertical competition in unitary states: The case of Italy

  • Albert Breton
  • , Angela Fraschini

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

In unitary states - states in which constitutional powers are owned by the central government vertical competition can generate stable outcomes, that is outcomes that do not unravel through arbitrary repossessions by the center. Stability is a product of institutional commitment devices. Through these a democratic government, though it cannot bind successor governments, can effectively oblige them to respect some of the decisions it has made. A number of such commitment devices exist in Italy; they make possible stable vertical competition between central and regional governments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)57-77
Number of pages21
JournalPublic Choice
Volume114
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2003
Externally publishedYes

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