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Thomas Hobbes Against the Aristotelian Account of the Virtues and His Renaissance Source Lorenzo Valla

  • Gianni Paganini

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

This chapter objects to the “ethicist” interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of morals, considering whether and how a more historical and contextual approach could confirm or disconfirm this sort of reading Hobbes. In this connection, it will be shown that knowledge of Hobbes’s Renaissance sources, first of all Valla, can help us to avoid not only historical but also philosophical misunderstandings, such as dismissing Hobbes’s objections to the Aristotelian theory of virtues. For his scientific approach to ethics that excludes the doctrine of mesótes, for his stressing the value of pleasure and self-preservation, for his criticism of the classic and Renaissance concept of “glory”, Hobbes reveals himself to have been influenced much more by Valla’s similar topics than by Aristotle’s approach, as Leo Strauss in the past and more recently Boonin-Vail and Ewin thought.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Archives of the History of Ideas/Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Idees
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages221-237
Number of pages17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameInternational Archives of the History of Ideas/Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Idees
Volume220
ISSN (Print)0066-6610
ISSN (Electronic)2215-0307

Keywords

  • Moral Philosophy
  • Moral Psychology
  • Moral Theory
  • Seventeenth Century
  • Virtue Ethic

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