Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

The independence of the Italian Constitutional Court

  • Albert Breton
  • , Angela Fraschini

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

It is often asserted that the Italian Constitutional Court is not independent of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government in Rome. We offer a view of independence that is congruent with bodies such as constitutional courts. We argue that the evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, however poor it may be, indicates that the Italian Constitutional Court is as independent as any other corresponding constitutional or supreme court of democratic countries. The evidence is not directly conclusive because the question, in the end, is not whether the judges, one by one, are independent, but whether the Court is independent. The evidence we offer pertains mostly to judges. If judges are independent, as that evidence seems to indicate, the Court is a fortiori even more independent.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)319-333
Number of pages15
JournalConstitutional Political Economy
Volume14
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2003
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Courts
  • Independence
  • Italy
  • Judges

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The independence of the Italian Constitutional Court'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this