Redistribution and crime when agents have limited liability: A note

Alberto Cassone; Carla Marchese

doi:10.2202/1555-5879.1035

Redistribution and crime when agents have limited liability: A note

Alberto Cassone
, Carla Marchese

Department of Law, Political, Social and Economic Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

Original language	English
Article number	2
Journal	Review of Law and Economics
Volume	2
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1035
Publication status	Published - 8 Sept 2006

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

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10.2202/1555-5879.1035

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AB - Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

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Redistribution and crime when agents have limited liability: A note

Abstract

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