Problems for Wright's entitlement theory

Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type—which Wright calls “cornerstones”—that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions—those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. In the following, I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. Against Wright, I submit that it is dubious that we are strategically entitled to accept cornerstones. For we are strategically entitled to do so only if a longstanding and apparently plausible view about the ultimate epistemic goal—veritic dual goal monism—is false. After this, I focus on entitlement in general. I contend that non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones in important cases cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. My argument rests on probabilistic regimentation of the so-called “leaching problem.” This criticism potentially strikes all forms of epistemic entitlement introduced by Wright at once, as each of them is supposed to be a type of nonevidential justification.