Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things

Matthew McGrath has recently challenged all theories that allow for immediate perceptual justification, that is, dogmatist views of justification. His challenge comes by way of arguing for what he calls the looks view of perceptual justification. McGrath argues that dogmatism and the looks view cannot both be correct, and since the looks view is true, dogmatism is false. In this chapter, we argue that McGraths argument against at least one form of dogmatism, Phenomenal Explanationism (PE), fails. In particular, we argue that McGraths argument in support of the looks view is unsound, and the view itself faces a serious problem. Additionally, we argue that the advantage that McGrath claims the looks view has over dogmatism when it comes to explaining defeat is illusory when the looks view is compared to PE. In sum, the looks view lacks proper motivation, and PE emerges from McGraths attack unscathed.