Il divieto di patti successorii e gli acquisti a causa di morte nel diritto romano

[Machine translation] It is common to find in civil negotiations the statement that the prohibition of inheritance pacts would be in continuity with Roman law, as supported by a large part of Roman doctrine. Within the latter, however, there is no lack of different visions that, based on a careful analysis of the sources, return the problem to its historical dimension, and circumscribe its scope considerably. In this perspective, this essay considers the breadth of the expression 'mortis causa capere', used by classical jurists to indicate a particular category of asset purchases, determined by stores arranged in view of their death. These stores are not testamentary in nature, and are obviously built on a contractual dimension. Emblematic, in this sense, is the example of the Donatio Mortis Causa, the development of whose doctrine in relation to Mortis Causa Capere seems to have to be traced back to the authority of Giuliano, which emerges repeatedly - still in the Severian age - in pieces of jurisprudence not exempt from contradictions and obscurity, for the most part collected in title XXXIX.6 of Justinian's Digest. The examination of the texts allows us to retrace the history of the mentioned Julian influence on jurists of later ages and prompts a further study on the relationship between the reflection of the prudents and the authoritative production of the considered sector of law.