TY - JOUR
T1 - Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
AU - Bhowmik, Anuj
AU - Centrone, Francesca
AU - Martellotti, Anna
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/10
Y1 - 2019/10
N2 - We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria.
AB - We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria.
KW - Asymmetric information
KW - Coalitional economies
KW - Core-Walras equivalence
KW - Finitely additive measure
KW - Private core
KW - Walrasian expectation equilibria
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069851885&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.003
M3 - Article
SN - 0304-4068
VL - 84
SP - 83
EP - 93
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
ER -