Believing fake news

In this chapter, I want to face the phenomenon of fake news by raising two questions, the first concerning the nature of fake news; the second addressing the issue from the viewpoint of the recipient or consumer. More specifically, I want to ask on the basis of which cognitive traps and mechanisms, cognizers end up believing fake news at a higher and faster rate than true news. In the first section of the chapter I shall thus take up the discussion on what fake news is and see whether a specific account can be provided that mark it specifically off compared to traditional forms of public deception. The relevant deception here is public for fake news typically affects large audiences and constitutes a public concern for a healthy democracy. In the second section of the chapter, I shall try to map the cognitive and motivational traps making people victims of this form of disinformation and deception. Finally, in the third section, I shall take up the discussion about possible remedies, focusing on the ones directed at improving individual epistemic responses to fake news exposure. I shall not deal with the controversial institutional remedies, but rather, I shall try to connect the findings in cognitive psychology and in epistemology with the studies of new media communications and see whether some hints for counteracting the effect of fake news can be found.